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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1951-1952*
I.

BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
CORPORATIONS

T

HE INFORMALITY with which small corporations transact their

affairs, particularly in the absence of legal advice, has been
as productive of litigation as the act of the proverbial testator
who drafts his own will and thereby provides a field day for
lawyers at the expense of his estate. A startling illustration of
this fact appears in the case of Chapman v. Barton,' one of two
significant cases decided during the year which involved an issue
of corporation law. It appeared therein that it had been the practice, at the annual meeting of the shareholders, to retain the board
of directors for an additional term pretty much by agreement and
without the formality of a written ballot. On the occasion in
question, the majority shareholders proposed to act according
to custom but a member of the minority demanded a ballot. The
presiding officer, expressing lack of familiarity with the by-laws,
said that he would secure legal advice and declared the meeting
adjourned until a lawyer could be consulted. The minority group
had, in the meantime, taken a written ballot among themselves and
* The present survey is not intended in any sense to be a complete commentary
upon, or annotation of, the cases decided by the Illinois courts during the past
year, but is published rather for the purpose of calling attention to cases and
developments believed significant and interesting. The period covered is that of the
judicial year, embracing from 409 Ill. 407 to 412 Ill. 309; from 344 Ill. App. 126
to 347 Ill. App. 182.
1345 111. App. 110, 102 N. E. (2d) 565 (1951).
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purported to elect a majority of the board of directors who, thereafter, took charge of the management of the company, discharged
the former officers and, in general, seized possession of its affairs.
A suit to enjoin the alleged conspiracy of the minority and, incidentally, to test the validity of the election so conducted, resulted
in a decree ousting the directors chosen by the minority and that
decree was affirmed, on appeal to the Appellate Court for the
Fourth District, despite the objection that the election was valid
and over the claim that a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto2 would be the only proper remedy. That decision was
attained on the basis of a distinction made between two earlier
cases,8 a distinction turning on the matter of the good faith of
the competing groups. In the absence of an appropriate use of
the principle of cumulative voting,4 it was said to be an act of
bad faith on the part of the minority to pursue their objective,
especially after they had, to all intents and purposes, agreed to
the adjournment of the annual meeting.
In the only other case of significance, that of People ex rel.
5 an attempt was
Barrett v. Annie Merner Pfeiffer Foundation,
made to produce the dissolution of a corporation organized not
for profit, one intended to support Korean educational institutions
by endowment and annual gifts and to promote artistic and scientific relations between the United States and Korea, on the ground
that the franchise had been obtained by fraud6 and because the
corporation had, subsequent to organization, engaged in profitmaking enterprises. The issue, however, arose on an appeal from
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 112, § 9(a). The court relied on Hall v. Woods,
325 Ill. 114, 156 N. E. 258 (1927), to support its view that an equity court would
have jurisdiction to enjoin unauthorized persons from interfering with the management of a domestic corporation.
3 Compare, for example, West Side Hospital v. Steele, 124 Ill. App. 534 (1906),
with Western Cottage Piano & Organ Co. v. Burrows, 144 Ill. App. 350 (1908).
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 157.28, authorizes cumulative voting. The
court in the instant case noted that, even if cumulative voting had been used, the
minority group would have been unable to secure any greater representation on
the board than it had previously enjoyed.
5345 Ill. App. 55, 102 N. E. (2d) 756 (1951).
6 See People v. White Circle League of America, 408 Ill. 564, 97 N. E. (2d) 811
(1951), noted in 30 CHIcAGo-KENT LAw REVIEW 2-3, for a decision authorizing
ouster where the not-for-profit corporation continues to violate the Criminal Code.
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an interlocutory order appointing a liquidating receiver 7 which
the Appellate Court for the First District held erroneous on the
ground that it had not been made to appear that dissolution of
the corporation should eventually result as a penalty for the
acts complained about.s In arriving at that result, the court
found no fraud had been charged merely because the corporation
might, under its by-laws, make distribution of its assets among
its members, for the by-laws in question were no broader in scope
than the provisions of the statute under which the organization
had been formed 9 or which currently prevail. 10 It was also of
the opinion that any charge of commercialized activity on the part
of the organization had been adequately refuted, at least on the
basis of the pleadings on file, or if not, had been abandoned so
as not to constitute a "continued" excess or abuse of the authority
conferred by law."
PRINGCIPAL AND AGENT

While the most noteworthy recent decision relating to the law
of principal and agent can best be discussed elsewhere, 1 2 other
agency cases furnish the basis for comment. One problem which
has repeatedly plagued courts, both here and elsewhere, formed
the subject of difficulty in the case of Parotto v. Standard Paving
Company.'" The principal question concerned was one as to
when and where an employee, who had departed from the path of
his duties, could be said to have returned to the orbit of his em7 The order was based on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 163a54. The appeal
from the interlocutory order rested on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 202.
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Gh. 32, § 163a53, authorizes an equity proceeding by
the Attorney General only If it is "made to appear that liquidation . . . should
precede the entry of a decree of dissolution" for the not-for-profit corporation.
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 32, § 158 et seq.

10 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 163a25, authorizes distribution in case of
dissolution, and ibid., § 163a44, directs the order of distribution.
11 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 32, § 163a49, for the grounds for involuntary
dissolution.
12 See discussion of the case of Tallios v. Tallios, 345 Ill. App. 387, 103 N. E. (2d)
507 (1952), noted in 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REviEw 343, dealing with the liability
of the principal for a tort inflicted by the husband-agent on the wife of the latter,
set out hereafter, Section V, Family Law, notes 20-2.
13 345 Ill. App. 486, 104 N. E.

REvmw 370.

(2d)

102 (1952),

Leave to appeal has been denied.

noted in 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
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ployment so as to make the employer liable for an accident caused
by the employee's negligent driving. The startling answer of the
Appellate Court for the First District was that, even though the
accident happened some four miles from the employer's garage
and about seven hours later than the time when the employee
should have returned the car for the night, the question of substantial deviation was not one to be decided as a matter of law
but remained a question for the jury. The court made much of
the fact that the employee, who had made the round of numerous
taverns, had turned in the direction of the employer's garage when
the accident occurred. It also advanced some new thoughts on
the problem by stating that the deviation which would bar an
employee from recovery under the Workmen's Compensation
Act 14 need not be as substantial as one which would be needed to
bar a third party from a recovery against the employer. To
permit the employee to recover from his employer for an injury
received while returning from a "frolic" of his own, undertaken
in violation of the terms of his employment, would allow him to
take advantage of his own wrong. No such consideration would
be present when a non-negligent third party suffered the injury.
The age-old problem of the "loaned servant" cropped up
again in the case of Henry v. Industrial Commission.1 5 The corporation there concerned needed carpenters to remodel its elevator.
It made an arrangement with a contractor, who was also a carpenter, to furnish the necessary men as and when needed. It
designated the number of men who were to work each day and also
instructed them as to the work to be done but they were paid their
wages by the contractor who received reimbursement, plus a small
differential, from the company. The extra payment was retained
by the contractor for his services in picking up tools. When one
of the workmen was injured on the job and sought compensation,
the Supreme Court decided that he was an employee of the corporation, rather than of the contractor, hence could recover compensation from it.
14 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.1 et seq.
15 412 l. 279, 106 N. E. (2d) 185 (1952).
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Scope of the agency relationship was involved in the case of
Freeport Journal-Standard Publishing Company v. Ziv Company,1 6 wherein a commercial manager of a radio broadcasting
station was held to have apparent authority to enter into a radio
transcription lease on behalf of the corporation which owned the
radio station. Noting that the duties of the commercial manager
included the selling of radio programs for the radio station, the
court opined that, in order to sell such programs, the manager
would necessarily have to have something in the way of material
to sell, hence had ostensible authority to acquire the material in
the first instance. The holding was strengthened by the fact that
the general manager of the station, after learning of the transcription lease, did nothing about it for approximately six months
and even then did not positively repudiate the transaction but
merely questioned its wisdom. Such conduct clearly amounted to
a ratification.
A principle all too often forgotten by some practitioners was
reiterated by the Appellate Court for the First District in Capitol
HardwareManufacturing Company v. Naponiello.17 It was necessary there to repeat the proposition that, when an agent enters
into a transaction on behalf of an undisclosed principal, the third
party, having discovered the identity of the principal, may file a
suit against both the agent and the principal but he must, before
judgment, elect against which he will proceed for there can be
no joint liability on the part of the agent and the principal under
such circumstances.
From among the many brokerage cases usually found in the
yearly grist of judicial labor, two should be mentioned. The first,
that of Hummel v. Thomas, 8 declares that where a real-estate
broker has been engaged to secure a purchaser and has done so,
he is entitled to his commission even though the offer of the prospective buyer fails to include a provision as to when possession
is to be transferred, provided the omitted provision is added later
Ill. App. 337, 103 N. E. (2d) 153 (1952).
345 I1. App. 272, 102 N. E. (2d) 85 (1951).
18345 Il1. App. 275, 102 N. E. (2d) 683 (1951).
16345

17

Leave to appeal has been denied.
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by negotiation of the parties and, as so revised, conforms to the
principal's notion of what the agency contract called for. The
fact that the revised offer may be subsequently rejected does not
mean that the broker's services are unsuccessful.
In the second case, that of Nicholson v. Alderson,19 an exclusive listing agreement provided that, in consideration of the
broker's promise to use his efforts to advertise and to sell the
real estate, the broker should have the exclusive right to sell for
a period of ninety days. It was also stipulated that if a sale was
made during that period, or within ninety days after the termination of the agreement, to anyone with whom the broker had had
negotiations with the owner's knowledge, the broker should receive
the usual commission. The owner in fact revoked the broker's
authority before the expiration of the ninety-day period and then
sold the property to a purchaser who had not been introduced by
the broker. In a suit by the broker for a commission based on the
sales price, the broker insisted that he had an executory contract
which became irrevocable when he began to perform so as to
make the owner liable in damages for the amount the broker would
have earned had not the owner wrongfully revoked the authority.
The Appellate Court disagreed with the broker's contention on
the ground the agency ceased to exist when the broker was notified
of the revocation of his authority and the same, not being one
coupled with an interest, was revocable at the will of the principal.
It did indicate, however, that as the broker's authority was to
continue for a stated period the principal could not rightfully
revoke the authority, unless for misconduct, without exposing
himself to liability for such damages as were directly incurred,
to-wit: the value of the services rendered to date of discharge
together with such disbursements as the broker may have made
in the principal's behalf.
The degree of laxity which Illinois courts have shown in
recent years, when dealing with an agent's fiduciary duty toward
his principal, has again been unfortunately demonstrated in the
19 347 Ill. App. 496, 107 N. E. (2d) 39 (1952).
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case of Glasser v. Essaness Theatres Corporation.20 In that
case, a managing agent of a motion picture theater, leased to a
partnership, was expressly charged with the duty of procuring a
renewal of the lease. When the landlord refused to renew or
extend the lease and declared it to be his intention to sell the
building, the agent informed the principal of this development,
suggesting that it would be advantageous for the partnership to
buy the building. Negotiations to that end were undertaken between the principal and the landlord. In the meantime, the agent
negotiated in his own behalf for the purchase of the building,
without informing his principal, and eventually acquired the
property. The principal then filed suit against the agent, basing
the claim upon an alleged destruction of the partnership expectancy of securing a renewal of the theater lease by reason of the
agent's purchase of the property. A majority of the Appellate
Court for the First District, one judge dissenting, refused to consider the agent's conduct as a breach of his fiduciary duty. It
declared that while it was true that an agent, entrusted with procuring an extension of a lease, could not negotiate for a lease
for his own benefit so long as his principal had the right to expect
a renewal of the lease, yet, as soon as that expectancy had been
extinguished without deception on the part of the agent, all reason
for the rule ceased so the agent could then properly obtain a
lease for himself or even purchase the building.
LABOR lAW.

Primary problems in the field of labor law pertained to issues
21
arising under the Illinois Unemployment Compensation Act.
An attack on the constitutionality of the provisions thereof dealing
with the contribution rate to be paid by an employer was parried
by the Supreme Court in the case of Conlon Bros. Manufacturing
Company v. Anvunzio. 22 For this purpose, employers are divided
into two groups, to-wit: those who qualify for a variable contribuFriend, J., wrote a dissenting
20 346 Ill. App. 72, 104 N. E. (2d) 510 (1952).
opinion. Leave to appeal has been granted.
21 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 300 et seq.
22 409 Ill. 277, 99 N. E. (2d) 119 (1951).
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tion rate because they have incurred liability based upon five or
more years of experience with the risk of unemployment, and those
who, because of lack of such experience, are compelled to pay
the full rate. 2' The employer in question challenged that classification as being arbitrary and unreasonable, 2 4 contending that the
basic rate bore no actual relationship to the risk of unemployment
or to the requirements of the state as a whole. The Supreme Court
declined to agree with that contention, pointing to the fact that
the statute was uniform in operation as applied to all employers
who had less than five years of experience, particularly since a
classification of the objects of legislation did not have to be
scientific, logical or consistent so long as the classification was
adapted to secure the avowed purpose of the statute.
Questions concerning the coverage of the Unemployment
Compensation Act also arise from time to time. In one case, that
of Wallace v. Annunzio, 2 5 certain attorneys who officed and associated with a law firm but who worked on their own cases as
well as on those referred to them by the firm and who did not
receive a salary but did divide the fees received according to an
arrangement made for the mutual advantage of both the attorneys
and the firm, were classified by the Director of Labor as covered
employees. The Supreme Court disagreed on the basis that while
the controlling statutory concept of employment is broader than
the common-law definition of the master-servant relationship it
does not make every act of service performed by one for another
sufficient to form the basis for a covered relationship. The statute
expressly excludes independent contractors from its purview2 6
and the attorneys in question were said to be such. In fact, the
relationship between the parties was more nearly one of landlord
and tenant for each associate had his own office and paid rent
therefor out of the percentage of fees credited to his account.
In another case, that of Mowry v. Board of Review,2 7 the
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 570.
24 The challenge was based on the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and on il. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 2.
25 411 Ill. 172, 103 N. E. (2d) 467 (1952).
26 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 322.
27 411 Ill. 508, 104 N. E. (2d) 280 (1952).
23
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question was one as to whether the leader of a band or the person
hiring the services of the band should be considered to be the
employer. The contract of hiring was conventional in form.
Under it, the hotel corporation was designated as "employer"
and the musicians as "employees," the latter agreeing to render
their services collectively to the "employer" under the leadership
of the band leader. The "employer" was to pay a lump sum
weekly to the band leader and he, in turn, was to distribute, on
behalf of the "employer," the amount so received to the several
members of the band, including himself, in accordance with a
schedule to be supplied by the hotel. The hotel was to have, at
all times, complete control over the services rendered by the
musicians, but it was up to the band leader, on behalf of the hotel,
to replace any of the band members. When the hotel was charged
with an obligation to make an employer's contribution for unemployment compensation, it objected on the theory that the
band leader was the real employer. The Illinois Supreme Court
upheld the position of the hotel. It noted that the Illinois statute
contains a provision to the effect that, irrespective of any contrary provision, a person is to be considered an employer who is
regarded as such for purpose of the federal unemployment tax. 28
29
As the United States Supreme Court, in Bartels v. BirminghaM,
had concluded that it was the band leader, and not the operator
of the dance hall where the band played, who was the employer
for federal unemployment tax purposes, the court concluded the
hotel was entitled to an implied exemption. It refused to be
bound by the language of the agreement, being guided instead by
the actualities of the case.
The operation of several businesses by the same person oftentimes gives rise to the problem as to whether such business enterprises can be lumped together and treated as an entity for unemployment tax purposes. The statute not only defines an "employer" but also defines an "employing unit" as one which,
28 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 370.
The federal tax is based on 26
U. S. C. A. § 1600 et seq.
29 332 U. S. 126, 67 S. Ct. 1547, 91 L. Ed. 1947, 172 A. L. R. 317 (1947).
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"together with one or more other employing units, is owned or
controlled, directly or indirectly, by legally enforceable means or
otherwise, by the same interests.' '30 It then requires that the
dominant interest must be treated as an employer provided there
are six or more persons employed in all of the employing units
when put together. In Todd v. Aminzio, 3 1 one Todd owned 75%
of one movie theater, 50% of another, and was the sole proprietor
of a third. Each theater had three employees and each was, to
some extent, operated as a separate business, having its own
office, maintaining a separate bank account in a different bank,
purchasing supplies and services independently, keeping separate
books, and filing separate social security and income tax returns.
Booking of films for all three theaters and their control and
supervision, however, was centered in Todd's managing agent.
Todd fought an assessment for contributions to the unemployment
compensation fund, contending that he did not own and control
the three theaters, but the Supreme Court, one judge dissenting,
rejected his arguments and affirmed a judgment declaring the
enterprises to be a single employing unit. The majority distinguished the instant case from the contrary holding on a similar
factual situation in Moriarty, Inc. v. Murphy,32 upon the ground
that the Director of Labor had there made no finding as to control,
thereby leaving out a vital prerequisite for the establishment of
33
coverage under the Unemployment Compensation Act.
The shutting down of a plant for vacation periods may generate claims for unemployment compensation benefits. The facts
in Grobe v. Board of Review 34 showed that the employees were
covered by a union contract which provided for a vacation with
pay fixed at a percentage of the employee's gross earnings for the
preceding year. The contract contemplated that when a departSee Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 315(B) and § 315(F).
31410 I1. 343, 102 N. E. (2d) 297 (1951).
Crampton, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion.
32 387 Ill. 119, 55 N. E. (2d) 281 (1944).
33 The court also ruled out an estoppel based upon a delay of almost five years
in assessing contributions and a delay of up to eighteen months in holding a hearing, with a consequent accrual of interest, on the theory an estoppel would be
inapplicable to the state when functioning in a governmental capacity.
-34409 Ill. 576, 101 N. E. (2d) 95 (1951).
30
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ment was closed down the employees thereof should then take
their vacation and receive their vacation pay but an employee was
permitted to request a vacation at some other time subject to
company approval. The company closed the plant for two weeks,
designating the time as a vacation period, and distributed the
stipulated vacation pay. An employee then immediately applied
for unemployment compensation benefits, contending that he was
unemployed during the two weeks in question and that the vacation pay did not constitute wages within the meaning of the
statute3 5 as he could, under the union contract, request a different
vacation period. The Supreme Court, affirming a trial court
decision denying benefits, disagreed with his contentions, pointing
out that it was the legislative intent to grant unemployment
36
compensation only to those who were involuntarily unemployed.
Not only must the claimant for benefits be involuntarily unemployed but he must also be "available for work. "37 In Fleiszig
v. Board of Review,35 the Supreme Court took the view that certain coal miners, over the age of sixty-five, who had left their
work in a coal mine and had thereafter elected to receive social
security benefits and a pension from their labor union, under a
plan which provided that they had actually to retire in order to
be eligible for such benefits, were not "available for work" within
the meaning of the statute. The court there made the rather
doubtful statement that an application for, and receipt of, retirement benefits and old-age assistance clearly evidences an intention
to retire from gainful labor.
Outside of unemployment compensation matters, the only
other issues involving elements of labor law were quite varied.
In Schaffer v. Park Bowl, Inc.,3 9 for example, the court declared
35 Ii1. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1,
36 Answering the employee's
"wages," the court pointed to
percentage of prior earnings,
services performed.
37 111. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1,
38412 Ill. 49, 104 N. E.

Ch. 48, § 344.
contention that the vacation pay did not constitute
the fact that the vacation pay was based upon a
hence was a part of compensation received for
Ch. 48, § 420(C).

(2d) 818 (1952),

noted in 30 CHICAGo-KENT LAw REVIEW

386.
39345 Ill. App. 279, 102 N. E.
REviEw 286.

(2d) 665 (1951),

noted in 30 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
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that where an employment contract is in force for a fixed period
and the employer, with knowledge of violations of duty on the
part of the employee, retains the employee he does not thereby
condone the employee's offenses but can use them as ground for
discharge thereafter if the violations should be continued but
may not discharge him solely on the basis of the prior violation
of duty. Another case, that of Keel v. Illinois Terminal Railroad
Company,40 tested the jurisdiction of a state court to entertain a
complaint for reinstatement offered on behalf of an allegedly
wrongfully discharged railroad employee. The employee's complaint consisted of two counts; the first for damages, the second
for reinstatement. The union contract which covered the working
conditions of the railroad employee in question provided for a
grievance procedure with the final determination over the legality
of a discharge being vested in the National Railway Labor Board.
Based upon these facts, the Appellate Court for the Fourth District held that a suit seeking both damages and reinstatement
was inconsistent. If the employee maintained that his employment relation was continuing and insisted upon reinstatement,
then the state court would lack jurisdiction because of the exclusive character of the grievance procedure. If, on the other
hand, the employee accepted his discharge as final and demanded
damages therefor, the state court would possess jurisdiction.
Under the circumstances, it was deemed necessary to reverse and
remand the case to give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend the
complaint, if he wished, to show the suit was clearly one for
damages only.
WORKMEN 'S COMPENSATION

Activities pursued by an employee during the course of his
employment, but intended to further his own health or comfort,
may generate a problem as to whether or not an injury sustained
by him arising from such activities is compensable under workmen's compensation statutes. In Hill-Luthy Company v. Indus40 346 Ill. App. 169, 104 N. E. (2d) 659 (1952).
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trial Commission,4 the employee, whose job it was to deliver and
install soft water tanks, proceeded to light a cigarette as he
returned to his delivery truck following an installation which he
had made at a customer's place. The head of the match flew off
and hit him directly in the eye, thereby causing a loss of eyesight.
The Illinois Supreme Court, affirming a judgment denying recovery, declared that the injury was not compensable because it did
not arise out of the employment although it had occurred in the
course thereof. Smoking and the use of matches were said to be
in no way incidental to the employment, any risks connected
therewith were entirely divorced from the employment, and were
no more than ones to which the general public was equally exposed
while performing similar acts.
Once the employee has left the employer's premises at the
close of the working day he is no longer in the course of his
employment but, under certain exceptional circumstances, this
rule may be modified to the extent that an employee might still
be deemed to be in the course of his employment if he uses, with
his employer's express or implied consent, premises adjacent to
the employer's business place as a means of ingress and egress.
Some coal miners, in Christian v. Chicago & Illinois Midland
Railway Company,4 2 having completed their day's work, drove
off the premises of the employer, riding in the car of a fellowemployee on their way home, when they were struck by one of
defendant's railroad trains and were killed. At that time, they
were on the defendant's right of way located across a roadway
which was not generally used by the public but did serve as one
of the means of ingress and egress to the premises of the employer. The roadway was, however, open to all members of the
public and was under the jurisdiction of the township highway
commissioner. The Supreme Court, reversing a judgment for the
defendant notwithstanding a verdict, concluded that the employees
in question were, at the time of the accident, not subjected to any
greater risk than would be true for other persons travelling on
41411 Ill. 201, 103 N. E. (2d) 605 (1952), noted in 1952 Ill. L. Forum 318.
42412 Il. 171, 105 N. E. (2d) 741 (1952).
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the roadway, hence the miners were not killed within the course
of their employment and their representatives were not limited to
43
compensation relief.
Limitation provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act
state that a claim thereunder is barred unless application is filed
with the Commission within one year after the date of injury or
within one year after the date of the last payment of compensation.4 4 These provisions received an unduly harsh and illiberal
interpretation by a majority of the Supreme Court, three judges
dissenting, in the case of International Harvester Company v.
IndustrialCommission.4 5 The employee there concerned had been
injured while working on his job. He notified the company physician and, in the ensuing nine-month period, during which he was
partly hospitalized and partly treated by the company physician,
he received weekly benefit payments from the funds of an "Employees' Benefit Association." Following his return to work, payments from the Association ceased. He thereupon filed an application for workmen's compensation benefits, more than one year
after the injury had occurred but within one year from the time
when he had last received a payment from the benefit association.
The Supreme Court reversed a holding in the employee's favor
made by the Industrial Commission and the lower court, upholding
the employer's contention that the application for compensation
came too late. It was said, by the majority, that payments made
by the "Employees' Benefit Association" could not qualify as
compensation since they were not made by the employer, were
unrelated to the provisions of the Act, and were inconsistent with
any acknowledgment of its application. The minority, in turn,
emphasized the illogic of the assumption indulged in by the
majority, to-wit: that payments unrelated to the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act could not suffice to stay the running
43 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.5(b), purports to limit the statutory
right to recover damages for wrongful death to those cases where the employee
was not in the line of duty.
44 Ibid., Ch. 48, § 138.6(c).
45410 Ill. 543, 103 N. E. (2d) 109 (1951).
Schaefer, J., wrote a dissenting
opinion, concurred in by Bristow and Hershey, JJ. See also note in 30 CHICAGOKENT LAW REvIEw

287.
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of the limitation period. The statute was said not to contain such
a requirement but, even if it did, the payments made by the benefit
association were, for all practical purposes, the same as payments
made by the company for it had actual control of the fund and
its employees handled both types of payment interchangeably.
A decision which vitally affects the whole structure of the
Workmen's Compensation Act was rendered by the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of Grasse v. Dealer's Transport Company 46 when it declared former Section 29 of the Act 4 7 to be
unconstitutional, thereby permitting a covered employee, injured
in the course of his employment by the negligence of a third party
tort-feasor who was bound by the Act, to maintain a common-law
action against such tort-feasor. The provision was deemed to be
unconstitutional by reason of a violation of the due process and
48
equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions
as well as for violating a state provision forbidding the granting
of special privileges and immunities. 9 The unique character of
the statutory provision in question, without counterpart in most
workmen's compensation laws, purported to forbid an Illinois
employee, injured by a third party tort-feasor who was bound by
the Act, from following his right to a recovery of common-law
damages and limited him to a recovery of compensation from his
employer. It imposed no such limitation on an employee injured
by an uncovered third party tort-feasor. The court found such
differentiation to be completely arbitrary and unreasonable, particularly since there was no rational basis for treating employees
differently solely because the tort-feasor who injured them was
or was not covered by the Act. Employer's subrogation rights
have also thereby been materially affected. 50
In that connection, mention should be made of the problem
46412 Ill. 179, 106 N. E. (2d) 124 (1952), noted in
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47 The text thereof was the same as Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.5(b).
48 U. S. Const., Amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 2
49 Iii. Const. 1870, Art. IV, § 22.
50 The provisions of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 138.5(b), are now in
need of substantial revision.
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raised by Melohn v. Ganley.5 1 The question there was one as to
whether or not an employer who had paid compensation to his
employee, injured by a third party not bound by the Act, would
be barred from instituting a subrogation proceeding against the
third party by reason of the fact that the third party had paid
damages to both the employer and the injured employee, pursuant to a judgment entered on their respective counterclaims, in an
earlier common-law proceeding. The Appellate Court for the
Second District answered that question in the affirmative. The
facts showed that the employee, while driving the truck of his
employer, had been injured by a non-covered third party. The
latter commenced a negligence action against the injured employee
and his employer, both of whom filed counterclaims alleging that
it was the third party who drove negligently. The jury were instructed, when assessing damages on the counterclaims, to consider
any possible future bodily suffering and loss of health the employee might sustain. Their verdict awarded damages to both
the employee and the employer. The employee thereafter filed
a claim for workmen's compensation against his employer and
the employer was required to pay a substantial sum, far in excess
of any recovery under his counterclaim. When the employer
sought subrogation against the third party, the trial court sustained a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground the
earlier proceeding was res judicata, and that decision was affirmed
on appeal. The mere fact that the damages awarded by the jury
in the first case were not substantial enough was deemed to be no
reason for supporting another action to secure reimbursement,
for the employer had obviously split his cause of action.
Equally novel was the question decided by the Supreme Court
in Lambert v. Industrial Commission.5 2 In that case, an employee
who had deficient vision, corrected 'by the use of eyeglasses, suffered an injury to his eye. The question then arose whether the
vision corrected by the use of glasses, or the uncorrected naked
vision, without artificial appliance of any kind, should be the
51344 Ill. App. 316, 100 N. E. (2d) 780 (1951), noted in 40 Ill. B. J. 238.
52 411 111. 593, 104 N. E. (2d) 783 (1952).
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basis for determining the degree of loss of sight or loss of use
of the eyes for compensation purposes. The employer argued for
the latter yardstick, contending that, since the uncorrected vision
of the injured employee was no worse after than it was before
the accident, the injury should not be compensable. The Supreme
Court did not agree. It pointed out that, the statute being silent
on the particular question, a practical and common-sense approach
was desirable. As the theory underlying workmen's compensation
was that industry, rather than society as a whole, should bear the
responsibility for its injured manpower, it was said to follow
therefrom that the injured workman should be compensated for
the financial loss suffered by him through a reduction in his industrial value. In the case at hand, the employer had hired an
employee with corrected vision, and he had performed his work
satisfactorily. The injury produced the same industrial loss to
the injured workman and to industry as would have attended the
loss of vision on the part of another employee having full vision.
For these reasons, it was held that vision as corrected should form
the basis for compensation.
One more case deserves a word of attention. In Fulton v.
Knight," the Industrial Commission had approved a lump sum
settlement between an employer and an injured employee who
had previously been adjudged insane but who was not represented by a guardian ad litem or conservator. A conservatrix,
appointed over a year later, then sought to obviate the effect
of the lump sum settlement but was denied relief. The Appellate
Court for the First District approved such decision, declaring
the order of the Commission valid on the basis that established
rules of practice and procedure which prevail in courts of law
are to be followed in compensation cases. As an insane person,
prior to appointment of a guardian or conservator, has the same
capacity to sue or to be sued as a person sui juris, neither a
judgment at law nor an award of the Industrial Commission
would be void or voidable merely because one of the parties
happens to be insane.
534W III. App. 122, 104 N. E. (2d) 554 (1952).

Leave to appeal has been denied.

